Verification and Detection of a Wireless-Leakage Hardware Trojan Horse with Covert Channels

DOI

10.2991/cimns-16.2016.28How to use a DOI?

Keywords

hardware trojan horse; covert channels; keys; encrpytion

Abstract

Hardware Trojan horses have become a troublesome challenge for security-sensitive integrated circuits. As one important categorization, the carrier of wireless-leakage hardware Trojan horse is radio wave, bypassed protective isolation equipment, such as traditional firewall. Even if no networking, it can also works, therefore more devilishness. This paper design a wireless-leakage hardware Trojan horse with Spartan-3E FPGA, which can pass system sensitive information to outside device with wireless radio signal by common pins, and the signals can be received by simple radios. Experimental results show that, a simple radio can receive the signal emitted by the hardware Trojan horse when their distance is more the 30 meters without any holdbacks. We also present a detection method and some defense suggestions.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yancang Chen
AU  - Ying Zhou
AU  - Pei Wei
AU  - Sai Sui
AU  - Yaxin Zhao
AU  - Minlei Zhang
AU  - Lunguo Xie
PY  - 2016/09
DA  - 2016/09
TI  - Verification and Detection of a Wireless-Leakage Hardware Trojan Horse with Covert Channels
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Communications, Information Management and Network Security
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 111
EP  - 114
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/cimns-16.2016.28
DO  - 10.2991/cimns-16.2016.28
ID  - Chen2016/09
ER  -