Using Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Police Patrols Scheduling
Kuang Wu Cheng, Chih-Chun Hou
Kuang Wu Cheng
Available Online November 2019.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26How to use a DOI?
- Nash equilibrium; Risk value; Shapley value; Patrol deployment
- This study proposes a two-step game theory model framework for the purpose of scheduling police patrol shifts. In the first step, the three important factors of interaction between criminals and police are modeled as a zero-sum non-cooperative game, and the risk value of each patrol area is obtained by calculating the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second step, the Shapley values of three different threat levels are calculated according to the rates of criminal events within three time periods. Finally, the Shapley value is derived based on the three criminal threat levels for each district. A fair allocation of police personnel based on the Shapley value is made with a minimum set of personnel deployment costs. This study used the 2016 San Francisco Public Security Bureau's open data for consolidation and calculations to validate the model. The experimental results show that police planners can use this framework to quantitatively evaluate the criminal threat in each district when deciding upon the deployment of patrol officers for three shifts per day.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Kuang Wu Cheng AU - Chih-Chun Hou PY - 2019/11 DA - 2019/11 TI - Using Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Police Patrols Scheduling BT - Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on Disaster Risk Analysis and Management in Chinese Littoral Regions (DRAMCLR 2019) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 103 EP - 108 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26 ID - Cheng2019/11 ER -