Using Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Police Patrols Scheduling

DOI

10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Nash equilibrium; Risk value; Shapley value; Patrol deployment

Abstract

This study proposes a two-step game theory model framework for the purpose of scheduling police patrol shifts. In the first step, the three important factors of interaction between criminals and police are modeled as a zero-sum non-cooperative game, and the risk value of each patrol area is obtained by calculating the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second step, the Shapley values of three different threat levels are calculated according to the rates of criminal events within three time periods. Finally, the Shapley value is derived based on the three criminal threat levels for each district. A fair allocation of police personnel based on the Shapley value is made with a minimum set of personnel deployment costs. This study used the 2016 San Francisco Public Security Bureau's open data for consolidation and calculations to validate the model. The experimental results show that police planners can use this framework to quantitatively evaluate the criminal threat in each district when deciding upon the deployment of patrol officers for three shifts per day.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Kuang Wu Cheng
AU  - Chih-Chun Hou
PY  - 2019/11
DA  - 2019/11
TI  - Using Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Police Patrols Scheduling
BT  - Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on Disaster Risk Analysis and Management in Chinese Littoral Regions (DRAMCLR 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 103
EP  - 108
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26
DO  - 10.2991/dramclr-19.2019.26
ID  - Cheng2019/11
ER  -