Study on the Green Construction Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Zhongfu Qin, Wei Wei, Min Qin
Available Online February 2017.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199How to use a DOI?
- Green construction; Evolutionary game; System stability; Regulatory strategy
- Under the green construction policy, this paper analyzes the game relationship between construction enterprise and supervision department, and sets up a green construction supervision evolutionary game model based on the replicated dynamic equation. By means of Jacobin matrix and other nonlinear system analysis methods, the stability of the equilibrium point of the game system is studied, and the factors that affect the level of green construction are analyzed. The result shows that there is no stable equilibrium in the static game system. After the supervision department takes the dynamic penalty strategy, the game system has an evolutionary stable equilibrium point. Improving the punishment and reward of the regulatory authorities or reducing regulatory costs, can effectively improve the level of green construction.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhongfu Qin AU - Wei Wei AU - Min Qin PY - 2017/02 DA - 2017/02 TI - Study on the Green Construction Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory BT - 2016 7th International Conference on Education, Management, Computer and Medicine (EMCM 2016) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-538X UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199 ID - Qin2017/02 ER -