Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Economic Management and Trade Cooperation

The Game Analysis of Development Investment Mode Selection in Lower Permeability Oilfield

Authors
Liu Yan-Chun, Jiang Wei-Dong, Ma Qing-Xi, Wang Li-Ping, Yan Jian-Jun
Corresponding Author
Liu Yan-Chun
Available Online April 2014.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/emtc-14.2014.15How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Lower Permeability Oil Fields; Oil Field Development; Investment Mode; Choice of Model; Game Theory
Abstract

A commissioned development and cooperative development is the main and commonly used form of foreign lower permeability oilfield development. In the case of information asymmetry, in the process of cooperation and game, permeability, recovery rate and yield are all elements and the interests of both parties concerned. It shows that cooperation can be reached regardless of the high and low permeability by constructing the selective model .When the probability of high permeability is greater, resources development party more like to take entrustment and transfer mode; if the probability of low permeability is greater, resources development party more like to take joint development mode in the lower permeability oilfield. What model, their respective predicted permeability, expected returns, reservation utility and so on are the Influencing factors. The development of an oil block involve both the resources development party and the resources owner. These owners can develop resources by themselves or commission them to others: Transferring the concession mining title of oil block to the developers for only a limited number of years by use of an agreement. Then the developers are in charge of the developing as well as receive compensation and the owner will take over the oil block when it achieve payback period of resources. In addition to these two methods, there still another method for the owners of resources: Both sides make joint contribution under a certain proportion, cooperatively develop the oil field and obtain a share of return. In the case of the commissioned development form, the owner of the resources (denoted as Party A)require the resources development party(denoted as Party B) to make efforts to increase the permeability and recovery ratio; under the cooperated development form, party A require the development ability of party B is better than that of party A in order to extend the exploitation year which means sustainable oilfield development and increase the interests of party A continuously. For this reason, regardless of whether commissioned development or cooperative development, both sides have common benefits in terms of increasing permeability, recovery ratio and output. In view of the practical situation, most of the oil field exploited at present are lower permeability oil fields and the level of permeability is an significant factor for these oil fields: the higher of the permeability, the less cost of increasing the output and of improving the recovery ratio, and vise versa.

Copyright
© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Economic Management and Trade Cooperation
Series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
April 2014
ISBN
978-94-6252-008-0
ISSN
1951-6851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/emtc-14.2014.15How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Liu Yan-Chun
AU  - Jiang Wei-Dong
AU  - Ma Qing-Xi
AU  - Wang Li-Ping
AU  - Yan Jian-Jun
PY  - 2014/04
DA  - 2014/04
TI  - The Game Analysis of Development Investment Mode Selection in Lower Permeability Oilfield
BT  - Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Economic Management and Trade Cooperation
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 87
EP  - 91
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emtc-14.2014.15
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emtc-14.2014.15
ID  - Yan-Chun2014/04
ER  -