An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior for Cluster Supply Chain

DOI

10.2991/febm-19.2019.47How to use a DOI?

Keywords

supply chain; information sharing; evolutionary game

Abstract

From the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper demonstrates the internal mechanism and evolution process of information sharing among horizontal enterprises in the cluster supply chain. Our results show that the number of information sharing, the marginal benefit of information sharing, the ability of information absorption, the incentive coefficient and the penalty coefficient for “free-riding behavior” are positively promoted to the information sharing behavior of enterprises in the supply chain. However, the marginal cost and risk coefficient of information sharing have a negative impact. Based on these influencing factors and the problem existing in the information sharing, the paper puts forward some suggestions to strengthen the awareness of enterprise information sharing, improve the information absorption capacity, establish an information sharing mechanism, and promote the coordinated development of enterprises.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yang Ye
AU  - Zhipeng Ju
AU  - Yue Li
PY  - 2019/12
DA  - 2019/12
TI  - An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior for Cluster Supply Chain
BT  - Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Economic and Business Management (FEBM 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 191
EP  - 194
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/febm-19.2019.47
DO  - 10.2991/febm-19.2019.47
ID  - Ye2019/12
ER  -