Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science

The Building of Relationship between the Taxation Authority and Tax Collector Based on the Principal-Agent Game Theory

Authors
Chunzhi Ou
Corresponding Author
Chunzhi Ou
Available Online January 2014.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.17How to use a DOI?
Keywords
interest, utility, game theory, principal-agent theory
Abstract
Despite its importance to tax collection and management efficiency,Grassroots tax collection is an understudied topic. This is partly attributable to the “tax collection and management predicament,” which arises because costs of tax collection and management are easier to measure than its benefits. In this study,we develop and test one game theory model between leviers and Tax authorities,this model explains the relationship between leviers and the tax authorities. Our findings have three key implications for public managers. First, the efficiency of tax collection can be improved if tax authorities meet and guide the needs of leviers. Second, mutual transformation on public–private interest poses more challenges and may require additional effort. Third, the mechanism of rewards and punishments has never worked well.
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This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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Proceedings
2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science (GECSS-14)
Part of series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
January 2014
ISBN
978-90-78677-96-3
ISSN
1951-6851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.17How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Chunzhi Ou
PY  - 2014/01
DA  - 2014/01
TI  - The Building of Relationship between the Taxation Authority and Tax Collector Based on the Principal-Agent Game Theory
BT  - 2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science (GECSS-14)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.17
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.17
ID  - Ou2014/01
ER  -