Over-Investment & Regulatory Capture in China’s Transportation Industry
Junlin Chen, Qian Shan
Available Online January 2014.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41How to use a DOI?
- transport network, over-investment, transfer barriers, regulatory cature
- To investigate the reason why consumers transfer from one transport network to another one is inconvenient in China while China has invested much in transportation infrastructure and suffer in conflict on its over-investment growth path, we considered the impact of infrastructure operators’ rent-seeking activities from asymmetrical information and cadres’ rank-order tournaments. We extended the framework of traditional economy growth theory by involving the mechanism between natural monopoly industries’ investment and regulation method, and concluded that the transfer barriers and regulatory capture emerges from collude between transport operators and cadres for seeking superiors government’ subsidies. The main solution is to minimize the opportunity of hidden cost information by regulatory agency reform and private operators introducing.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Junlin Chen AU - Qian Shan PY - 2014/01 DA - 2014/01 TI - Over-Investment & Regulatory Capture in China’s Transportation Industry BT - 2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science (GECSS-14) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41 ID - Chen2014/01 ER -