A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries
Xiaoming Qiu, Ying Wang
Available Online October 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9How to use a DOI?
- governments; new energy industries; performance assessment mechanism; game theory; chicken game
- This paper analyzes the ongoing game scenario of local governments’ efforts in developing new energy industries under a tournament-type performance appraisal system and draws two conclusions on the basis of chicken game and first-price sealed auction. The two conclusions are: (1) local governments’ competition efforts present a likelihood of excess capacity in the new energy sector instead of the intended overall promotion of the industries, thus reducing the local profits and harming the long-term sector-wide benefits; (2) the competing game between new-energy investors and local governments assumes a high degree of possibility of landing local governments in a prisoners’ dilemma, thus alluring local governments to adopt any preferential policy options in fear of losing the game.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiaoming Qiu AU - Ying Wang PY - 2013/10 DA - 2013/10 TI - A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries BT - International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 37 EP - 41 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9 ID - Qiu2013/10 ER -