Proceedings of the 2013 International Academic Workshop on Social Science

A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries

Authors
Xiaoming Qiu, Ying Wang
Corresponding Author
Xiaoming Qiu
Available Online October 2013.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9How to use a DOI?
Keywords
governments; new energy industries; performance assessment mechanism; game theory; chicken game
Abstract
This paper analyzes the ongoing game scenario of local governments’ efforts in developing new energy industries under a tournament-type performance appraisal system and draws two conclusions on the basis of chicken game and first-price sealed auction. The two conclusions are: (1) local governments’ competition efforts present a likelihood of excess capacity in the new energy sector instead of the intended overall promotion of the industries, thus reducing the local profits and harming the long-term sector-wide benefits; (2) the competing game between new-energy investors and local governments assumes a high degree of possibility of landing local governments in a prisoners’ dilemma, thus alluring local governments to adopt any preferential policy options in fear of losing the game.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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Proceedings
International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13)
Part of series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
October 2013
ISBN
978-90-78677-84-0
ISSN
1951-6851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoming Qiu
AU  - Ying Wang
PY  - 2013/10
DA  - 2013/10
TI  - A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries
BT  - International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 37
EP  - 41
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9
ID  - Qiu2013/10
ER  -