Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project
Kan-kan Xu, Jin-xian Zhao
Available Online October 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95How to use a DOI?
- construction period incentive; contractor; PPP; principal-agent game model; project company
- The inherent characteristics of PPP financing mode demands that the participants of the project cooperation with each other and form a community of interests. In construction phase, the project company cooperates with the contractor under the mode of general contracting; meanwhile their game relationship determines whether the project is going to success. Through establishing a principal-agent game model between the project company and the contractor and then discussing their game relationship in the view of period incentive, this paper compares the form of period incentive under the condition of information symmetry with that of information asymmetry, on the basis of which we analyze the optimization problem of period incentive and then reach the optimal form of incentive measures.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Kan-kan Xu AU - Jin-xian Zhao PY - 2013/10 DA - 2013/10 TI - Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project BT - International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95 ID - Xu2013/10 ER -