Proceedings of the 2013 International Academic Workshop on Social Science

Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project

Authors
Kan-kan Xu, Jin-xian Zhao
Corresponding Author
Kan-kan Xu
Available Online October 2013.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95How to use a DOI?
Keywords
construction period incentive; contractor; PPP; principal-agent game model; project company
Abstract
The inherent characteristics of PPP financing mode demands that the participants of the project cooperation with each other and form a community of interests. In construction phase, the project company cooperates with the contractor under the mode of general contracting; meanwhile their game relationship determines whether the project is going to success. Through establishing a principal-agent game model between the project company and the contractor and then discussing their game relationship in the view of period incentive, this paper compares the form of period incentive under the condition of information symmetry with that of information asymmetry, on the basis of which we analyze the optimization problem of period incentive and then reach the optimal form of incentive measures.
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Proceedings
International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13)
Part of series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
October 2013
ISBN
978-90-78677-84-0
ISSN
1951-6851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Kan-kan Xu
AU  - Jin-xian Zhao
PY  - 2013/10
DA  - 2013/10
TI  - Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project
BT  - International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95
ID  - Xu2013/10
ER  -