Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project

DOI

10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95How to use a DOI?

Keywords

construction period incentive; contractor; PPP; principal-agent game model; project company

Abstract

The inherent characteristics of PPP financing mode demands that the participants of the project cooperation with each other and form a community of interests. In construction phase, the project company cooperates with the contractor under the mode of general contracting; meanwhile their game relationship determines whether the project is going to success. Through establishing a principal-agent game model between the project company and the contractor and then discussing their game relationship in the view of period incentive, this paper compares the form of period incentive under the condition of information symmetry with that of information asymmetry, on the basis of which we analyze the optimization problem of period incentive and then reach the optimal form of incentive measures.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Kan-kan Xu
AU  - Jin-xian Zhao
PY  - 2013/10
DA  - 2013/10
TI  - Period Incentive Research on the Construction Phase of PPP Project
BT  - Proceedings of the 2013 International Academic Workshop on Social Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 429
EP  - 434
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95
DO  - 10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.95
ID  - Xu2013/10
ER  -