The Games between Central and Local Governments in the Newest Regulatory Policy of the Real Estate Market
Ming-li Gong, Han Jiang
Available Online August 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr.2013.39How to use a DOI?
- real estate market ; government ; mixed strategy Nash equilibrium model.
- Chinese central government has promulgated a series of policies and measures to regulate the real estate market to restrain the rapid increasing of the house price, but the effect seems unsatisfactory. This paper mainly aims at analyzing the origin of this issue by the game theory, thus we establish an Intergovernmental Static Nash Equilibrium model and a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Model as well. Based on the final equilibrium point, we find that it’s the uneven interests’ distribution between central and local government which leads to the failure of the newest policy, and strengthening regulation and adjusting the structure of interests’ distribution can be efficient ways to solve the problem.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Ming-li Gong AU - Han Jiang PY - 2013/08 DA - 2013/08 TI - The Games between Central and Local Governments in the Newest Regulatory Policy of the Real Estate Market BT - 2013 International Conference on Applied Social Science Research (ICASSR-2013) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 138 EP - 140 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr.2013.39 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr.2013.39 ID - Gong2013/08 ER -