The Influence of Non-State-Owned Shareholders on Auditor Selection in Mixed Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
Available Online 20 December 2019.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083How to use a DOI?
- Mixed Reform of State-owned Enterprises, Auditor selection, Ownership structure
- The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is an important tendency of current and future reform of state-owned enterprises in China. Improving the corporate governance level of state-owned enterprises is one of important causes of the reformation. Considering the important role of auditing in corporate governance, this paper tests the influence of non-state-owned major shareholders on auditor selection of state-owned enterprises by using China’s A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as research samples. The study found that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in the governance of state-owned enterprises increased the demand for high-quality audit. Further research shows that different administrative levels and industrial competition degree have no significant influence on non-state-owned shareholders' participation in state-owned enterprise’s corporate governance.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Ping CHEN PY - 2019 DA - 2019/12/20 TI - The Influence of Non-State-Owned Shareholders on Auditor Selection in Mixed Reform of State-Owned Enterprises BT - Proceedings of the 2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2019) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 468 EP - 473 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083 ID - CHEN2019 ER -