Research on Signaling Mechanism for Marketization Recruitment of Managers in Mixed Ownership Enterprises

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.117How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Mixed ownership enterprise, Marketization Recruitment, Manager, Ability, Signaling

Abstract

Under the background of the gradual implementation of the professional manager system in mixed ownership enterprises and marketization recruitment of managers by the board of directors in China, exploratory research on marketization recruitment mechanism of managers in mixed ownership enterprises needs theoretical guidance and support from the related theories of identification scheme and mechanism. Due to the unobservability of manager ability and manager’s behavior of hiding information, problems of manager selection can only be sloved through the identification of manager ability information. By applying the approach of signaling in information economics, this study explores the feasibility and effectiveness of the business plans submitted by managers in mixed ownership enterprises as a non-educational signal to transfer the information on manager ability, so as to provide a theoretical ground and reference for the establishment of marketization recruitment mechanism of managers in mixed ownership enterprises.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ping Sun
PY  - 2019
DA  - 2019/12/20
TI  - Research on Signaling Mechanism for Marketization Recruitment of Managers in Mixed Ownership Enterprises
BT  - Proceedings of the 2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 641
EP  - 647
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.117
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.117
ID  - Sun2019
ER  -