Research on the Role of Chinese Board of Directors in Anti-hostile Takeover
A Case Study of Vanke Acquisition
These authors contributed equally.
- 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.142How to use a DOI?
- Anti-hostile takeover; Board of directors; Distribution of power
This paper discusses the board of directors’ position in preventing malicious takeover from the perspective of internal right distribution and institutional structure of Listed Companies in China and compares China’s company law with British and American company law. The first part of the article describes the current situation of hostile takeover in China combined with the equity dispute between China Vanke Co., Ltd. and Baoneng Investment Group Co., Ltd., and points out that the board of shareholders is generally superior to the board of directors in China. The second part explains that the occurrence of hostile takeover in China is due to the lag of China’s existing laws, the incompatibility of China’s transplantation of foreign company law system, and the underdeveloped concept of corporate autonomy. In the third part, this paper puts forward some suggestions on strengthening the function of the board of directors, establishing an anti-hostile takeover committee, and drawing lessons from the British and American board system.
- © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Siyi Li AU - Yixuan Song AU - Yuechen Wang PY - 2021 DA - 2021/12/15 TI - Research on the Role of Chinese Board of Directors in Anti-hostile Takeover BT - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 874 EP - 879 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.142 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.142 ID - Li2021 ER -