Does Institutional Investor Ownership Influence Corporate Inefficient Investment? Evidence from China
Yanyue Han1, †, Yuxin Sun2, *, †, CIN JIP YAU3, †
1Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts, Concordia University, 1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd. W. Montreal, Quebec, Canada
2Business Computing and Entrepreneurship, Goldsmiths University of London, Loring Management Centre, St. James, New Cross, London, SE14 6AD
3Faculty of businesses and law, Coventry University, Priory St, Coventry CV1 5FB
These authors contributed equally.
*Corresponding author. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Available Online 15 December 2021.
- 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.084How to use a DOI?
- Corporate Inefficient Investment; Institutional Investor Ownership
In recent years, researchers focus on studying main factors that result in an inefficient corporate investment. We designed a regression model to show institutional investor ownership’s influence on a firm’s inefficient investment. We disclose that manager’s actions that violate the employment of institutional investors can reduce shareholder’s interests. Consequently, employing institutional investors plays an important role in helping a firm’s corporate governance and positively affects the firm’s development.
- © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Yanyue Han AU - Yuxin Sun AU - CIN JIP YAU PY - 2021 DA - 2021/12/15 TI - Does Institutional Investor Ownership Influence Corporate Inefficient Investment? Evidence from China BT - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 511 EP - 517 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.084 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.084 ID - Han2021 ER -