Evolution of Tripartite Dynamic Game and Simulation Analysis among Regulators, Fund Managers and Investors
These authors contributed equally.
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.054How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Securities investment fund; behavior analysis; dynamic game; replication dynamic equation; simulation analysis; penalty intensity; legal supervision; tripartite evolutionary game
- Abstract
In recent years, securities investment fund plays an increasingly important role in China’s securities market, which is a collective securities investment mode of interest co-existence and risk-sharing. However, principal-agent problems arise due to information asymmetry and utility imbalance among three parties of securities investment: fund manager, regulator, and investors. This paper analyzes the balanced relationship among fund managers, regulators, and investors from the perspective of the dynamic game. The results show that the additional effects of penalty intensity, credit loss, and supervision greatly affect the specific behaviors of the three parties. In order to make a perfect investment system of China’s securities investment fund market, this paper makes some suggestions to fund managers, regulators, and investors on perfecting laws and regulations, increasing punishment, and raising investment awareness.
- Copyright
- © 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Hang Lu AU - Jiale Shen AU - Ruolin Yang PY - 2022 DA - 2022/07/01 TI - Evolution of Tripartite Dynamic Game and Simulation Analysis among Regulators, Fund Managers and Investors BT - Proceedings of the 2022 2nd International Conference on Enterprise Management and Economic Development (ICEMED 2022) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 328 EP - 336 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.054 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.054 ID - Lu2022 ER -