Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Education, Management Science and Economics

Coordinated Contract Design for Two-Level Supply Chain Considering Supplier's Quality Level

Authors
Pin Zhuang
Corresponding Author
Pin Zhuang
Available Online December 2016.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icemse-16.2016.3How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Supply chain contract, game theory, supplier's quality, channel coordination
Abstract
This paper investigated procurement contracts in a two-level supply chain system which includes a supplier and a manufacturer who sells the supplier's product to the final market, and the market demand function was given by linear demand function in quality and price. We designed three supply chain contract models employing game theory: optimal contracts in centralized control setting, profit margin contract and profit sharing contract in decentralized control setting. The study shows that the profit sharing contract could achieve supply chain channel coordination in decentralized setting, besides, the retail price is decreasing function with supplier's quality level, and meanwhile the order quantity and the expected profit are increasing functions with supplier's quality level.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Download article (PDF)

Proceedings
2016 International Conference on Education, Management Science and Economics
Part of series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
December 2016
ISBN
978-94-6252-275-6
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icemse-16.2016.3How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Pin Zhuang
PY  - 2016/12
DA  - 2016/12
TI  - Coordinated Contract Design for Two-Level Supply Chain Considering Supplier's Quality Level
BT  - 2016 International Conference on Education, Management Science and Economics
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 10
EP  - 13
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icemse-16.2016.3
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icemse-16.2016.3
ID  - Zhuang2016/12
ER  -