Compliance Risks Arising from the Decentralization of Internal Oversight in Multinational Enterprises: The Case of AstraZeneca China’s Insurance Fraud

DOI

10.2991/978-2-38476-585-0_82How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Compliance Risk; Internal Oversight; Decentralization; Corporate governance; Multinational Enterprises

Abstract

In recent years, compliance issues have frequently been exposed among multinational enterprises (MNEs) in emerging markets, drawing wide attention to the effectiveness of their internal control and regulatory mechanisms. Especially in the context of accelerating decentralization and “local authorization” strategies, how to balance global compliance standards with local governance realities has become one of the core challenges in cross-border operations.

This study takes the AstraZeneca China insurance fraud case as the starting point to examine the mechanisms of compliance risk and institutional vulnerabilities faced by MNEs under dispersed authority and cultural differences. Through a systematic review of the incident, in combination with relevant literature on corporate governance, compliance management, and cultural accounting theory, the paper reveals that regulatory failure often stems from information asymmetry, incentive bias and oversight blind spots between headquarters and local subsidiaries—problems that are particularly pronounced in contexts characterized by high power distance and weak disclosure cultures. The research further found that without embedding effectively culture-sensitive mechanisms, MNEs’ “local authorization” strategies may fail to improve governance efficiency and, instead, amplify systemic risks of local misconduct. This analysis enriches the theoretical perspective on culture and compliance in multinational governance and offers policy implications for building more resilient and adaptive global compliance frameworks-emphasizing the need for a dynamic balance between global consistency and local adaptability.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiyue Zhang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/18
TI  - Compliance Risks Arising from the Decentralization of Internal Oversight in Multinational Enterprises: The Case of AstraZeneca China’s Insurance Fraud
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 International Conference on Hybrid Commerce, Human Capital, and Economic Dynamics (ICHCH 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 727
EP  - 735
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-585-0_82
DO  - 10.2991/978-2-38476-585-0_82
ID  - Zhang2026
ER  -