Cooperative Stability Analysis of Industry Clusters Considering the Risk of Information Sharing Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_177How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Industrial clusters; Information sharing; Evolutionary game
- Abstract
Information sharing has an important impact on the stability of cooperation in industrial clusters. Considering the risk of information sharing, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the synergy relationship between “ordinary enterprises and core enterprises”. The stability conditions of the two-party game model are determined by means of Jacobian matrix, and finally the evolutionary path of each player in the game model is verified by using MATLAB. The study shows that the loss of benefits and the cost of active information sharing are the decisive factors in the core enterprises’ decision on information sharing strategy, and the evolutionary strategy of ordinary enterprises is influenced by the core enterprises. When the strategy of the core enterprises evolves to “synergy cooperation”, the strategy of ordinary enterprises will also evolve to “synergy cooperation”. Based on this, while improving the stability of industrial cluster cooperation, information sharing platform should be established to prevent the risk of information sharing, and incentive and constraint mechanism should be established to reduce the cost of information sharing.
- Copyright
- © 2024 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiangyuan Shu AU - Ruian Mei AU - Mengdi Sui AU - Cheng Chen PY - 2023 DA - 2023/10/09 TI - Cooperative Stability Analysis of Industry Clusters Considering the Risk of Information Sharing Based on Evolutionary Game Theory BT - Proceedings of the 2023 4th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM 2023) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1735 EP - 1748 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_177 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_177 ID - Shu2023 ER -