Executive Compensation & Companies’ Soft and Hard Investment
- https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200908.008How to use a DOI?
- executive compensation, managerial decision, risk taking behavior, corporate strategy
Executive Compensation is a critical issue today, since executives’ decisions, motivated by compensation incentives, critically affect firms’ value and stakeholders’ interest. Consistent with prior literature, we have documented a positive (negative) relationship between Vega (Delta) from executive option holding and firm’s R&D spending, which is a proxy for risk-taking. This paper incrementally documents that Vega will not only incentivize R&D, but also it will increase firm’s capital expenditure on a relative weaker scale, because investment with more tangibility will be less risky. Moreover, the results denoted that top management team’s (excluding CEO) compensation incentives contribute to the corporate decision in the same manner as CEO’s incentive does. Lastly, the results for post-2006 period are qualitatively the same as pre-2006 period.
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Dongxu Yang AU - Shizhong Xiong AU - Tian Tan PY - 2020 DA - 2020/09/08 TI - Executive Compensation & Companies’ Soft and Hard Investment BT - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Economy, Management and Entrepreneurship (ICOEME 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 48 EP - 53 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200908.008 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200908.008 ID - Yang2020 ER -