The Hierarchical Discrepancy in Chinese Government Behaviors and the Weakness in Policy Execution
- Hu Wuxian, Hu Hui
- Corresponding Author
- Hu Wuxian
Available Online August 2012.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/icpm.2012.7How to use a DOI?
- Central Government, Local Governments, Hierarchical Discrepancy, Incentive Incompatibility, Policy Execution.
- This paper puts forward a hypothesis suggesting a hierarchical discrepancy between Chinese central government and the local governments, which argues that, in the progress of policy making and implementation, the central government is an encompassing group, whose policy making stems from the historical responsibilities it carries, while the local governments, though politically obedient to the central government, and competing in economy with each other, usually take local economic growth into account during policy execution. By developing a double-task principal-agent model between central government and local governments, this paper comes to a conclusion that the incentive incompatibility, in the discipline contract between central government and local governments, is likely the root cause of the weakness in policy execution.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Hu Wuxian AU - Hu Hui PY - 2012/08 DA - 2012/08 TI - The Hierarchical Discrepancy in Chinese Government Behaviors and the Weakness in Policy Execution BT - Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Public Management (ICPM-2012) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 163 EP - 168 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icpm.2012.7 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/icpm.2012.7 ID - Wuxian2012/08 ER -