Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing
Qiang Xiong, Xiaoyan Chen
Available Online July 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90How to use a DOI?
- Security Information; Repeated Game; Incentive Mechanism; Sharing
- In addition to the security investment, security information sharing among firms has been proved to be an effective measure. In order to enhance the level of information security and improve the social welfare, this paper studies how to promote sharing through a certain reasonable incentive mechanism. We adopt the repeated game theory to establish incentive mechanism and analyze how similarity, isolation period, discount factor, proportion of rational firms and so on effect the efficiency of this incentive mechanism. We finally conclude the conditions required by the effective mechanism.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Qiang Xiong AU - Xiaoyan Chen PY - 2013/07 DA - 2013/07 TI - Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing BT - 2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90 ID - Xiong2013/07 ER -