Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013)

Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing

Authors
Qiang Xiong, Xiaoyan Chen
Corresponding Author
Qiang Xiong
Available Online July 2013.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Security Information; Repeated Game; Incentive Mechanism; Sharing
Abstract
In addition to the security investment, security information sharing among firms has been proved to be an effective measure. In order to enhance the level of information security and improve the social welfare, this paper studies how to promote sharing through a certain reasonable incentive mechanism. We adopt the repeated game theory to establish incentive mechanism and analyze how similarity, isolation period, discount factor, proportion of rational firms and so on effect the efficiency of this incentive mechanism. We finally conclude the conditions required by the effective mechanism.
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Proceedings
2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013)
Part of series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
July 2013
ISBN
978-90-78677-75-8
ISSN
1951-6851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Qiang Xiong
AU  - Xiaoyan Chen
PY  - 2013/07
DA  - 2013/07
TI  - Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing
BT  - 2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90
ID  - Xiong2013/07
ER  -