Revenue-sharing Contract of Supply Chain with Sale Effort Cost Partaking
- 10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240How to use a DOI?
- Supply chain coordination; Revenue-sharing contract; Effort effect; Cost partaking
As an effective method to coordinate supply chain, revenue-sharing contract cannot function when the demand is uncertain and dependent on the retailer’s sale effort. Considering a supply chain with one single supplier serving one retailer, the aforementioned result is explained through the theoretical analysis. To coordinate the supply chain, a new revenue sharing contract with sale effort cost partaking was therefore proposed, and the supply chain coordination can be achieved. The new contract is apt to implement because of few contract parameters. Finally, a numerical example was given to illustrate the model and obtain the optimal allocation proportion of revenue. The proposed model demonstrated that both supplier and retailer can gain more profits when the new contract is applied.
- © 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhiyong Liu PY - 2015/07 DA - 2015/07 TI - Revenue-sharing Contract of Supply Chain with Sale Effort Cost Partaking BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Logistics, Engineering, Management and Computer Science PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1203 EP - 1206 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240 DO - 10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240 ID - Liu2015/07 ER -