The Analysis of Game Equilibrium on the Monitoring of Improper Examination Behaviors in the Universities

DOI

10.2991/meici-18.2018.35How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Improper behavior; Nash equilibrium; Prevention & control measure

Abstract

With the development of modern technologies, a variety of improper examination behaviors have emerged in the universities. From the new perspective of monitoring the examination as a game behavior, this paper has identified the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the compromise strategy for monitoring students’ improper examination behaviors after the transformation of monitoring game. Proposing to weaken the punishment of improper examination behaviors, this paper has also designed the relevant guarantee mechanism. Those measures can cooperate to effectively control the transformed game of improper examination behaviors and maintain the integrity in the examination.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Na Zhao
PY  - 2018/12
DA  - 2018/12
TI  - The Analysis of Game Equilibrium on the Monitoring of Improper Examination Behaviors in the Universities
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 8th International Conference on Management, Education and Information (MEICI 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 184
EP  - 188
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/meici-18.2018.35
DO  - 10.2991/meici-18.2018.35
ID  - Zhao2018/12
ER  -