Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2016)

Evolution Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior between Supply Chain Members

Authors
Kan Yang, Shuangliang Tian, Xiahong Cai, Susu Jiao
Corresponding Author
Kan Yang
Available Online February 2017.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Information Sharing; Evolution Game; Information Internalization Innovation Ability
Abstract
In this paper, we use the idea and method of evolutionary game to construct the asymmetric game problem information sharing in Stackelberg model, which is dominated by the manufacturer.The results show that the dynamic evolution of the system is not stable. The success or failure of information sharing with the manufacturer and retailer is related to their the initial strategic state and internalization innovation capabilities, respectively.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Kan Yang
AU  - Shuangliang Tian
AU  - Xiahong Cai
AU  - Susu Jiao
PY  - 2017/02
DA  - 2017/02
TI  - Evolution Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior between Supply Chain Members
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2016)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87
ID  - Yang2017/02
ER  -