Evolution Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior between Supply Chain Members
Kan Yang, Shuangliang Tian, Xiahong Cai, Susu Jiao
Available Online February 2017.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87How to use a DOI?
- Information Sharing; Evolution Game; Information Internalization Innovation Ability
- In this paper, we use the idea and method of evolutionary game to construct the asymmetric game problem information sharing in Stackelberg model, which is dominated by the manufacturer.The results show that the dynamic evolution of the system is not stable. The success or failure of information sharing with the manufacturer and retailer is related to their the initial strategic state and internalization innovation capabilities, respectively.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Kan Yang AU - Shuangliang Tian AU - Xiahong Cai AU - Susu Jiao PY - 2017/02 DA - 2017/02 TI - Evolution Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior between Supply Chain Members BT - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2016) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.87 ID - Yang2017/02 ER -