Development of Market-prestige Model for Project Supervision
- 10.2991/asei-15.2015.376How to use a DOI?
- Project supervision; Market-prestige model; Incentive mechanism
The paper aims to investigate the incentive mechanism of project supervision organizers by using the market-prestige model. The results of two-stage game analysis indicated that the game process can be maintained at least two stages under asymmetric information. In Stage I, the efforts of project supervisors were motivated by the expectation of their job performance. In Stage II, the income of supervisors relied on the expectation of supervision performance in Stage I. The efforts of project supervisors were strictly over zero in Stage I with respect to their prestige. Hence, the prestige can be considered as parts of the explicit incentive contract in project supervision.
- © 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhongshan Lu AU - Shuping Yang PY - 2015/05 DA - 2015/05 TI - Development of Market-prestige Model for Project Supervision BT - Proceedings of the 2015 International conference on Applied Science and Engineering Innovation PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1905 EP - 1908 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/asei-15.2015.376 DO - 10.2991/asei-15.2015.376 ID - Lu2015/05 ER -