Analysis of the Principle of Multiagent System Functioning in Assessing the Effectiveness of Regulatory Legal Acts
- 10.2991/aer.k.200202.037How to use a DOI?
- game theory, multi-agent systems, subjects of law, efficiency of regulatory legal acts, payoff function, legislative imbalance
Despite economic and legal measures that have been taken by the state in recent years, effective regulation of many economic processes is at the stage of formation. Absence of adequate economic policy and creation of balanced legislation regulating these processes impedes sustainable economic development of both the regions and state as a whole. It is possible to solve the problem through natural science methods in the Humanities, as well as new approaches to assessing the effectiveness of current legislation regulating economic processes, by means of its mathematical modeling. There is a need to develop a methodology for modeling multi-agent systems as a tool for assessing the effectiveness of regulatory legal acts restricting socio-economic processes. The study analyzes multi-agent system functioning as a tool for assessing the effectiveness of regulatory legal acts, it presents the participants of legal relations as agents characterized by a certain model of behavior, pursuing different goals in content, leading to a conflict of interest, but being able to integrate into systems that jointly solve complex problems. Using the above strategy of agents synthesizing, it is necessary to take into account the ability of agents to perceive and process inaccurate, fuzzy and contradictory information, which the current legislation represents. The authors conclude that the participants of administrative relations are characterized by centralized multi-agent system functioning, with a coordinator who manages all agents and coordinates their actions by creating legislation trying to keep the status of internal and external environment in balance. The quality of decisions of a large initial problem should be evaluated using some global function, the value of which depends on local decisions of the agent, often in a rather complex way. In particular, such a function can be a vector one. In the end, based on the behavior of agents of the system, it is reasonable to build a payoff function and find the so-called “equilibrium point” (Nash equilibrium). When constructing the current legislation in the suggested format, most of the problems of regulatory enforcement will disappear spontaneously, because another model of behavior of agents will not be beneficial to them.
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - A. A. Mamedov AU - A. Yu. Kindaev AU - V. N. Batova AU - A.V. Moiseev PY - 2020 DA - 2020/02/08 TI - Analysis of the Principle of Multiagent System Functioning in Assessing the Effectiveness of Regulatory Legal Acts BT - Proceedings of the IV International Scientific and Practical Conference 'Anthropogenic Transformation of Geospace: Nature, Economy, Society' (ATG 2019) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 181 EP - 186 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aer.k.200202.037 DO - 10.2991/aer.k.200202.037 ID - Mamedov2020 ER -