Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society

Fresh Agri-Food Supply Chain Retailers and Suppliers Price Game

Authors
Qian Tong, Xiaoxi Tong, Yuanyuan Li
Corresponding Author
Qian Tong
Available Online January 2015.
DOI
10.2991/emcs-15.2015.1How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Supply chain; Fresh agri-foods; Game; Retailers; Suppliers
Abstract

In the supply chain of fresh agricultural foods and food safety, participants for each activity are making their efforts to obtain the maximize benefits, and every interests owners are playing the maximizing benefit Game. As the main parts in the supply chain, suppliers provide their Optimal order quantity and the corresponding punitive cost strategy basing on the least cost target. On the contrary, retailers as the following parts, whose ordering costs and inventory costs are fully controlled by suppliers. Suppliers put the extra supply capacity to get maximum benefit as response, whereas retailers have to obey the decisions made by the suppliers. This paper analyzes two cases in the supply chain: establishing game model with completely independent decision-making and with information sharing. Furthermore, it also take full advantage of Game model to obtain the model between suppliers and retailers in Supply Chain. Finally the paper discusses that when suppliers and retailers achieve the optimal Game effect at the case of cooperation, whether both benefits keep the direct relationship with their investment.In the supply chain of fresh agricultural foods and food safety, participants for each activity are making their efforts to obtain the maximize benefits, and every interests owners are playing the maximizing benefit Game. As the main parts in the supply chain, suppliers provide their Optimal order quantity and the corresponding punitive cost strategy basing on the least cost target. On the contrary, retailers as the following parts, whose ordering costs and inventory costs are fully controlled by suppliers. Suppliers put the extra supply capacity to get maximum benefit as response, whereas retailers have to obey the decisions made by the suppliers. This paper analyzes two cases in the supply chain: establishing game model with completely independent decision-making and with information sharing. Furthermore, it also take full advantage of Game model to obtain the model between suppliers and retailers in Supply Chain. Finally the paper discusses that when suppliers and retailers achieve the optimal Game effect at the case of cooperation, whether both benefits keep the direct relationship with their investment.

Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society
Series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
January 2015
ISBN
10.2991/emcs-15.2015.1
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
10.2991/emcs-15.2015.1How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Qian Tong
AU  - Xiaoxi Tong
AU  - Yuanyuan Li
PY  - 2015/01
DA  - 2015/01
TI  - Fresh Agri-Food Supply Chain Retailers and Suppliers Price Game
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1
EP  - 5
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.1
DO  - 10.2991/emcs-15.2015.1
ID  - Tong2015/01
ER  -