A China Case Study on Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling
Available Online August 2018.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.11How to use a DOI?
- Corporate Governance; Big Shareholders; Controlled Supportive Behavior; Tunnel Behavior
- This paper, with the help of China Top Software Company case, have analyzed both the motivation and implement approaches of propping and tunneling actualized by big shareholders of China's listed companies. Propping and tunneling both are main shareholders' behavior of transferring benefits in different directions in order to maximize their own benefits, the propping aims at raise the performance targets of listed companies, and that tunneling, which usually does not have an effect on the current performance but which causes a long-term harm to company's value and minority shareholders' interests, aims to transfer actual resources to main shareholders.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Tangmei Yuan PY - 2018/08 DA - 2018/08 TI - A China Case Study on Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling PB - Atlantis Press SP - 47 EP - 53 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.11 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.11 ID - Yuan2018/08 ER -