The Application of Deferred Acceptance Mechanism in Senior High-school Admission

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.220306.033How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Market design; Deferred acceptance; School choice; Strategy proofness

Abstract

In Zhucheng, Shandong Province, China, the existing mechanism in remaining admission to allocate students to public senior high-school requires each student to randomly take a place and students can exchange their places if they are unsatisfied with their random places. But exchanges must satisfy some conditions, such as requirements of both students’ scores. It is hard to tell counterparties. To optimize the existing mechanism, this paper suggests modifying it by gathering preferences of all students who are unsatisfied with their random places first, treating students with different scores as different types, and then applying deferred acceptance to reallocating students by types. This research proves that this new mechanism is feasible. In this environment, DA (deferred acceptance) is a very successful mechanism, because it ensures the rational use of educational resources, individual rationality, elimination of justified envy, and strategy proof. Moreover, it can maintain the results of score diversification realized by existing mechanism, that students with different scores are randomly distributed to 4 public senior high-schools.

Copyright

© 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Qing Wang
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/03/17
TI  - The Application of Deferred Acceptance Mechanism in Senior High-school Admission
BT  - Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Economy, Management, Law and Education (EMLE 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 205
EP  - 209
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220306.033
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220306.033
ID  - Wang2022
ER  -