Research on the Risk Rating and Risk Control Measures on E-commerce Credit based on Nash Game Analysis

DOI

10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Risk Control; E-commerce; Nash Game Analysis; Risk Rating; Literature Analysis.

Abstract

This paper analyzes on the risk rating and risk control measures on E-commerce credit based on the Nash game analysis. Based on game theory, as both parties is always looking for the optimal strategy from the perspective of their own, thus forming the Nash equilibrium as the main body of the existence of opportunistic behavior, if in a bad credit environment, market supervision mechanism is not sound, a trader with an unreliable but can get extra income. E-commerce model is traditionally divided into B2B, B2C and the C2C three kinds. Look from the current development situation, B2B and C2C development relatively well in the two sort of modes. Under this condition, this paper proposes the new perspective on the related issues and proposes the evaluation model for the E-commerce credit that will promote and enhance the crediting system.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoyan Zhang
PY  - 2016/08
DA  - 2016/08
TI  - Research on the Risk Rating and Risk Control Measures on E-commerce Credit based on Nash Game Analysis
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Economics, Social Science, Arts, Education and Management Engineering
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 520
EP  - 523
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110
DO  - 10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110
ID  - Zhang2016/08
ER  -