Research on the Risk Rating and Risk Control Measures on E-commerce Credit based on Nash Game Analysis
- 10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110How to use a DOI?
- Risk Control; E-commerce; Nash Game Analysis; Risk Rating; Literature Analysis.
This paper analyzes on the risk rating and risk control measures on E-commerce credit based on the Nash game analysis. Based on game theory, as both parties is always looking for the optimal strategy from the perspective of their own, thus forming the Nash equilibrium as the main body of the existence of opportunistic behavior, if in a bad credit environment, market supervision mechanism is not sound, a trader with an unreliable but can get extra income. E-commerce model is traditionally divided into B2B, B2C and the C2C three kinds. Look from the current development situation, B2B and C2C development relatively well in the two sort of modes. Under this condition, this paper proposes the new perspective on the related issues and proposes the evaluation model for the E-commerce credit that will promote and enhance the crediting system.
- © 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiaoyan Zhang PY - 2016/08 DA - 2016/08 TI - Research on the Risk Rating and Risk Control Measures on E-commerce Credit based on Nash Game Analysis BT - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Economics, Social Science, Arts, Education and Management Engineering PB - Atlantis Press SP - 520 EP - 523 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110 DO - 10.2991/essaeme-16.2016.110 ID - Zhang2016/08 ER -