Mechanism design of Multi-attribute reverse auction on margin bid
Biao Liu, Benjiang Ma, Farhan Bashir Muhammad
Available Online April 2018.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109How to use a DOI?
- multi-attribute auction; single-attribute auction; margin; procurement;
- Designing a multi-attribute auction has many advantages in respect to attributes besides price. Nevertheless, the complexity of this method makes it hard to carry out the optimal mechanism. This paper combines the first-sealed auction mechanism with multi-attribute auction, and gives a method of transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction on margin bid. The analysis indicates that this method can just not only reduce the transaction risk caused by suppliers who will abandon the bid, but also makes the multi-attribute auction more easier to implement and operate; Besides, the method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions under which the highest bidding supplier will win the auction.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Biao Liu AU - Benjiang Ma AU - Farhan Bashir Muhammad PY - 2018/04 DA - 2018/04 TI - Mechanism design of Multi-attribute reverse auction on margin bid BT - 2018 4th International Conference on Education Technology, Management and Humanities Science (ETMHS 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109 ID - Liu2018/04 ER -