Scientific Incentive Mechanism of College English Teachers
Xiaofang Zhang, Jianhui Liu
Available Online October 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154How to use a DOI?
- institutional economics; incentive mechanism; scientific research; college English teachers; tenure system.
- Base on the principal-agent theories, this paper, from the angle of institutional economics, compares the optimal incentive contract on college English teachers under single-period moral hazard and under repeated moral hazard and introduces tenure contract in the model of repeated moral hazard. Our study finds the following results: (1) in the pre-tenure period under tenure contract with repeated moral hazard, the principal pays less to college English teachers to promote their incentive of hard-working in scientific research than in the case of single-period moral hazard; (2) college English teachers with tenure are much more difficult to be stimulated to work hard in scientific research and the college management layer has to pay much more to them for their hard work in academic field; (3) tenure system is cost-efficient in the pre-tenure period but is not necessarily cost-efficient in the tenure period.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiaofang Zhang AU - Jianhui Liu PY - 2013/10 DA - 2013/10 TI - Scientific Incentive Mechanism of College English Teachers BT - International Academic Workshop on Social Science (IAW-SC-13) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 697 EP - 700 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154 ID - Zhang2013/10 ER -