Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises in the Reverse Logistics of Waste Household Appliances

DOI

10.2991/ic3me-15.2015.122How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Reverse logistics; Waste household appliances; Static game; Dynamic game

Abstract

This paper uses game theory to analyze the behavior of government and enterprises in the Reverse Logistics (RL) of Waste Household Appliances (WHA). A static game model and a dynamic game model are established to study respectively the periods of establishing and operating the Reverse Logistics System (RLS). We find that (1)enterprises will establish the RLS when government can levy heavy fine on those not establishing the RLS and when enterprises make profits from establishing; (2)enterprises will operate the RLS actively when government subsidize them much. Then we discuss accordingly the strategies government should adopt in the RL of WHA. This paper contributes to the theoretical analysis and policy practices of reverse logistics of waste household appliances from the perspective of game theory.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jiani Lou
AU  - Tianjun Hu
PY  - 2015/08
DA  - 2015/08
TI  - Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises in the Reverse Logistics of Waste Household Appliances
BT  - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Material, Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 621
EP  - 629
SN  - 2352-5401
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/ic3me-15.2015.122
DO  - 10.2991/ic3me-15.2015.122
ID  - Lou2015/08
ER  -