Proceedings of the 3d International Conference on Applied Social Science Research

Game Analysis of Collusion between Managers And Independent Directors —— Based on Government Supervision Model

Authors
Feng-su Yang, Xiao-rong Du, Ma-li Ji
Corresponding Author
Feng-su Yang
Available Online August 2016.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr-15.2016.45How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Managers, Independent directors, Government supervision, Collusion, Game analysis
Abstract
The paper first analyzes the motivation of the appearance of collusion between managers and independent directors. Then, based on the conspiracy theory,the paper establishes the game model on collusion between managers and independent directors under government supervision. Next, the paper analyzes all the factors contributing to the collusion from the perspective of game theory. Lastly, some suggestions are put forward about how to prevent the collusion based on game analysis. The study finds it is effective to stop the collusion by improving government supervision quality, establishing an effective penalty mechanism, perfecting independent directors' salary system and strengthening the directors’ reputation incentive mechanism.
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Proceedings
3d International Conference on Applied Social Science Research (ICASSR 2015)
Part of series
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research
Publication Date
August 2016
ISBN
978-94-6252-148-3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr-15.2016.45How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Feng-su Yang
AU  - Xiao-rong Du
AU  - Ma-li Ji
PY  - 2016/08
DA  - 2016/08
TI  - Game Analysis of Collusion between Managers And Independent Directors —— Based on Government Supervision Model
BT  - 3d International Conference on Applied Social Science Research (ICASSR 2015)
PB  - Atlantis Press
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr-15.2016.45
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr-15.2016.45
ID  - Yang2016/08
ER  -