Analysis on Open Account in China from the Perspective of Prisoners’ Dilemma

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.211209.224How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Public goods game; Open account; Prisoners’ Dilemma

Abstract

Open account is a common behavior in international trade. There are such cases that exporters suffered great loss when importers suddenly disappear even they had successful corporation previously. To avoid loss, consigner should stop corporation when he thinks his partner could not afford to fulfill the contract, which shows a great similarity with prisoners’ dilemma. In prisoners’ dilemma, according to backward induction, both players should not corporate in the beginning. However, most of the players will corporate at first, and tend to defect near the end. This paper contains current studies of open account and the result of interview done by the author. The experiment method used in this paper is interview of export traders by phone calls. Interviewees includes manager of risk control center of Xiamen ITG Group Corp, a Fortune 500 company. The interview has showed current situation of open account behavior in China, major methods of preventing loss, changes during the pandemic, and so on. In conclusion, the author suggest enterprises in China to seize the current opportunity, and use more open account to expand.

Copyright

© 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jingxing Gao
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/12/15
TI  - Analysis on Open Account in China from the Perspective of Prisoners’ Dilemma
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1377
EP  - 1382
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.224
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.224
ID  - Gao2021
ER  -