Game Analysis of Japan’s Nuclear Wastewater Discharge and China’s Countermeasures

DOI

10.2991/978-2-494069-89-3_197How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Japan nuclear wastewater; Prisoner; s dilemma; two-level game theory

Abstract

This article first introduces the timeline behind Japan's announcement of direct discharge of nuclear wastewater into the Pacific Ocean and the effects of discharging nuclear wastewater. Then it introduces the non-zero-sum game. After that, using the prisoner's dilemma in game theory, this article analyzes why Japan persists in discharging nuclear wastewater despite social opposition. Then, it uses the prisoner's dilemma theory in game theory to explore the reasons behind the event. Furthermore, through the theory of two-level game theory, this paper explores the reasons behind the incident at the national and international levels. Finally, it discusses China's Remedy as a country affected by Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge.

Copyright

© 2022 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Yaodan Zhang
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/12/30
TI  - Game Analysis of Japan’s Nuclear Wastewater Discharge and China’s Countermeasures
BT  - Proceedings of the 2022 5th International Conference on Humanities Education and Social Sciences (ICHESS 2022)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1714
EP  - 1721
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-494069-89-3_197
DO  - 10.2991/978-2-494069-89-3_197
ID  - Zhang2022
ER  -