Xiong Xie, Mei-Yan Chen, Xiao-Wen Jie
The paper constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprise and public in the intervention of government, so as to discuss the strategy choice that is whether enterprise fulfills social responsibility or public conduct supervision. Through establishing replicated dynamic equation of the game between enterprise and public, and using Jacobi matrix local stability analysis method to analyze the stability of the replicated dynamic system in local equilibrium, and further explore the dynamic evolution process of game under different incentives intensity of government. The result shows that when the government incentives intensity is large enough, the enterprises that have stronger brand awareness are more willing to fulfill social responsibility; on the contrary, low brand awareness enterprises do not have that strong motivation to fulfill social responsibility. In addition, in a long-term game, public could choose the policy of no supervision, and also indicate that under the condition of asymmetric information, the public have difficult to supervise the enterprise behaviors. According to the above analysis, this paper put forward specific suggestions from the level of government, the public and enterprise.