Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/icmemi-15.2015.33How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Corporate social responsibility, Evolutionary game theory, Replicated dynamic equation, Evolutionary stable strategy.

Abstract

The paper constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprise and public in the intervention of government, so as to discuss the strategy choice that is whether enterprise fulfills social responsibility or public conduct supervision. Through establishing replicated dynamic equation of the game between enterprise and public, and using Jacobi matrix local stability analysis method to analyze the stability of the replicated dynamic system in local equilibrium, and further explore the dynamic evolution process of game under different incentives intensity of government. The result shows that when the government incentives intensity is large enough, the enterprises that have stronger brand awareness are more willing to fulfill social responsibility; on the contrary, low brand awareness enterprises do not have that strong motivation to fulfill social responsibility. In addition, in a long-term game, public could choose the policy of no supervision, and also indicate that under the condition of asymmetric information, the public have difficult to supervise the enterprise behaviors. According to the above analysis, this paper put forward specific suggestions from the level of government, the public and enterprise.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiong Xie
AU  - Mei-Yan Chen
AU  - Xiao-Wen Jie
PY  - 2015/01
DA  - 2015/01
TI  - Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Management Engineering and Management Innovation
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 175
EP  - 180
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmemi-15.2015.33
DO  - 10.2991/icmemi-15.2015.33
ID  - Xie2015/01
ER  -