Pricing Strategy of Remanufacturing Closed - loop Supply Chain Based on Subsidy and Carbon Tax Mechanism
- DOI
- 10.2991/icsd-16.2017.90How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- component; closed-loop supply chain; stackelberg game; prive strategy; subsidy mechanism; carbon tax mechanism
- Abstract
Under the government subsidy and carbon tax mechanism, a game-pricing model of government and closed-loop supply chain members is established for closed-loop supply chain system consisting of manufacturers, retailers and third parties. The optimal subsidy intensity and carbon tax rate are obtained by the maximum social welfare. Then, the impact of the proportion of waste materials on the subsidy intensity and carbon tax rate, recycling strategy of waste products and the profit of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain members is analyzed by numerical simulation. The study shows that the government adopts a low subsidy and low carbon tax strategy for the raw materials, and adopts a higher subsidy and a higher carbon tax policy for the discarded goods in the component level, and adopts a high subsidy and high carbon tax strategy for the product scrap. Therefore, the recycling prices of waste products, recovery efforts with the decline in the quality of waste products are increased. Product wholesale prices and retail prices are rising with the rise in product quality.
- Copyright
- © 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Wen Liu AU - Hai-Yan Wang AU - Long-Gang Li AU - Jie Deng PY - 2016/12 DA - 2016/12 TI - Pricing Strategy of Remanufacturing Closed - loop Supply Chain Based on Subsidy and Carbon Tax Mechanism BT - Proceedings of the 2nd 2016 International Conference on Sustainable Development (ICSD 2016) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 405 EP - 411 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icsd-16.2017.90 DO - 10.2991/icsd-16.2017.90 ID - Liu2016/12 ER -