Research on the Independence of the Central Bank and Its Inspiration to the PBC
Wei Qiu, Kun Xiong
Available Online 2 November 2020.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201030.067How to use a DOI?
- central bank independence, The People’s Bank of China, conservative banker theory, monetary policy
- The central bank of a country generally undertakes important tasks such as stabilizing prices, preventing high inflation and conducting financial supervision. It plays a vital role in a country’s economy and financial market. The central bank’s monetary policy has implications for all industries. In order to study the independence of my country’s central bank, this article first defines the independence of the central bank at two levels, analyzes several typical foreign banks of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of Korea, and then analyzes the independence of the People’s Bank of China. An in-depth interpretation of the current situation is analyzed, and some suggestions for improving the independence of the People’s Bank of China is put forward in this paper.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Wei Qiu AU - Kun Xiong PY - 2020 DA - 2020/11/02 TI - Research on the Independence of the Central Bank and Its Inspiration to the PBC BT - 2020 International Conference on Social Sciences and Big Data Application (ICSSBDA 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 332 EP - 336 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201030.067 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201030.067 ID - Qiu2020 ER -