Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021)

Application of Game Theory on People Dealing with Masks

Authors
Qiao Li
Corresponding Author
Qiao Li
Available Online 8 April 2021.
DOI
10.2991/assehr.k.210407.197How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Game theory, prisoner’s dilemma, COVID-19, masks, regulations
Abstract

For the outbreak of COVID-19, the easiest and most effective method of prevention is to wear a mask. However, many citizens remain strongly opposed to wearing masks. Therefore, it is very important to understand people’s psychology about wearing masks. This study was conducted to understand the behaviour of the public from the perspective of the dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium by building a game model. It can be found that people are more inclined to not wear masks. Hence, government measures are required, included both making people aware of the shame and taking strong measures.

Copyright
© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021)
Series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
8 April 2021
ISBN
10.2991/assehr.k.210407.197
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
10.2991/assehr.k.210407.197How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Qiao Li
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/04/08
TI  - Application of Game Theory on People Dealing with Masks
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1048
EP  - 1051
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.197
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.210407.197
ID  - Li2021
ER  -