Sustainability Investment of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation
Yuyu Chen, Jianfei Gu
Available Online 8 April 2021.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045How to use a DOI?
- Cap-and-trade regulation, Sustainability investment, Stackelberg game, Consignment contract
- Taking into account the consumer has a low carbon preference, under the dual driving force of environment production and economic benefit, the manufacturer will invest in emission reduction technology in the upstream and downstream, such as introduce emission reduction equipment or cleaner production technology. We focus on a two-echelon sustainable supply chain that includes single manufacturer and single retailer. We explore how should manufacturer rationally choose the way of investment in emission reduction, i.e., whether the manufacturer should invest in both upstream and downstream or only in the upstream. Compared with the sustainable investment only in the upstream, investment in both upstream and downstream is more sustainable and profitable.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Yuyu Chen AU - Jianfei Gu PY - 2021 DA - 2021/04/08 TI - Sustainability Investment of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation BT - Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 222 EP - 226 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045 ID - Chen2021 ER -