Study on Mine Ecological Restoration Deposit System Based on Evolutionary Game
Feifei Cao, Guangcheng Wang
Available Online September 2015.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/ifeesm-15.2015.47How to use a DOI?
- Mine environment restoration; Deposit system; Evolutionary game theory; Simulation
- In 2006,our government further deepened the reform of coal resources paid use system, and gradually established coal mine environment and ecological restoration responsibility mechanisms, implementing mine ecological restoration deposit system. However,there is risk in the process of the deposit system implementation, some enterprises escaping ecological restoration through camouflage. There are more likely to appear in collision between mining enterprises and government, sacrificing environment to embezzlement deposit. Based on game theory, this paper studies the relationship between coal mining enterprises and local government in the process of the deposit system implementation. By constructing and analyzing game model, the conclusion reaches as following:when incentive subsidy by higher authorities is greater than local government regulatory costs,the higher the actual probability of regulatory success, the easier the system tends to local government regulatory, compliance ecological restoration of coal mining enterprises; when the actual probability of regulatory success is low,the system can not evolve into socially desired optimal state by increasing penalties.The actual probability of regulatory success and incentive subsidy of higher authorities have a key role in the implementation of mining ecological restoration deposit system.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Feifei Cao AU - Guangcheng Wang PY - 2015/09 DA - 2015/09 TI - Study on Mine Ecological Restoration Deposit System Based on Evolutionary Game BT - Proceedings of the 2015 International Forum on Energy, Environment Science and Materials PB - Atlantis Press SP - 242 EP - 249 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/ifeesm-15.2015.47 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/ifeesm-15.2015.47 ID - Cao2015/09 ER -