Human Resource Management in a Project Co-Investment Model Under the Conditions of the Multiple Interests of the Participating Agents
I Zaitseva, O Malafeyev, A Dolgopolova, I Antonova, D Shlaev
Available Online 17 March 2020.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.087How to use a DOI?
- Many practical tasks of economic activity and a number of important issues of economic theory are associated with tasks of determining the optimal solution. This article proposes a game-theoretic version of the transport problem with changing conditions, that is, a problem in which the parameters of the system depend on time. For this model, the problem of finding the compromise values of the income functions of all participants and the corresponding sequence of control sets that implement the compromise trajectory is solved. The dynamic programming approach in this case is that the problem being solved “plunges” into a wider class of problems described by a number of parameters, and after that, using the principle of optimality, the main recurrent relation is determined based on the definition of a compromise set. When a compromise is found at each stage, an optimal trajectory emerges on our tree, the movement along which gives a compromise in the entire multi-step problem.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - I Zaitseva AU - O Malafeyev AU - A Dolgopolova AU - I Antonova AU - D Shlaev PY - 2020 DA - 2020/03/17 TI - Human Resource Management in a Project Co-Investment Model Under the Conditions of the Multiple Interests of the Participating Agents BT - Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 602 EP - 606 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.087 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.087 ID - Zaitseva2020 ER -