On the Security of a Public Auditing Protocol for Shared Data with Efficient User Revocation in the Cloud

DOI

10.2991/isci-15.2015.220How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Public auditing; Shared data; Cloud storage; User revocation; Cryptanalysis

Abstract

Recently, Wang et. al. proposed a public auditing protocol with efficient user's revocation for shared data in the cloud storage (InfoCom 2013, 2904-2912). By taking a careful look at the scheme, we noticed that their scheme has inherent limitations. In short, In short, the auditor cannot find the correct public key to verify those re-signatures which are converted from the original signatures. In this paper, we show a detailed weakness analysis on Wang et al.’s protocol, and propose a solution to remedy the weakness without sacrificing any desirable features of the mechanism.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - FangChao Ma
AU  - Hechao Li
AU  - Hua Guo
AU  - ChunHe Xia
PY  - 2015/01
DA  - 2015/01
TI  - On the Security of a Public Auditing Protocol for Shared Data with Efficient User Revocation in the Cloud
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Symposium on Computers & Informatics
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1647
EP  - 1655
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isci-15.2015.220
DO  - 10.2991/isci-15.2015.220
ID  - Ma2015/01
ER  -