Mechanism Design for the Joint Control of Pollution

DOI

10.2991/ism3e-15.2015.90How to use a DOI?

Abstract

From the perspective of the central government, this paper analyzed that the externality of pollution control would lead to market inefficiency, and studied the implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium and sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Study found: Market inefficiency came from private information and inadequate supervision of the mechanism designer, and the sufficient and necessary conditions of implementation in Nash equilibrium have been gotten, also a dynamic mechanism to realize the joint control of regional air pollution was built. At the same time, a mechanism with asymmetric information was posed to implement the goal function in dominant equilibrium.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - F. Xue Zhang
AU  - J. Wang
PY  - 2015/11
DA  - 2015/11
TI  - Mechanism Design for the Joint Control of Pollution
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Symposium on Material, Energy and Environment Engineering
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 370
EP  - 376
SN  - 2352-5401
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/ism3e-15.2015.90
DO  - 10.2991/ism3e-15.2015.90
ID  - Zhang2015/11
ER  -