Research on the Selection of Arbitrators Based on Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.200312.022How to use a DOI?

Keywords

selection of arbitrators, Veto-rank Mechanism, Short-listing mechanism

Abstract

This paper established a model to describe a specific problem called the selection of arbitrators in general classes. This model involves a party of two choosing among a list of arbitrators with their opponents’ vetoes and their preference ranking. Firstly, this paper founded mechanisms to depict social properties, which concentrate on the social choice rule (SCR) to choose results that are at least as efficient as the median outcome for both players, and two criteria Pareto efficiency and minimal satisfaction test (MST) are used to measure the mechanisms. Secondly, the paper evaluated two mechanisms of Veto-rank Mechanism (VR) and Short-listing mechanism (SL), respectively. After evaluating the two mechanisms, the paper proposed two main propositions which supplemented the current research results with the previous research results. Finally, some limitations of the paper have been stated and concluded that more considerations and circumstances can be discussed further in the future, and whether the results of this paper can still be reasonable in more complex situations.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xingtong He
AU  - Xinyan Jiang
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/03/18
TI  - Research on the Selection of Arbitrators Based on Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 128
EP  - 131
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200312.022
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.200312.022
ID  - He2020
ER  -