Reputation Mechanism in Multiphase Game to Control the Moral Hazard of Aging Service Supplier
Zhiyong Zhang, Haiping Wu, Yongqiang Shi
Available Online February 2017.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90How to use a DOI?
- Aging Service Supply Chain; multiphase game; reputation mechanism; moral hazard.
- Aging service supply chain is a new trend of aging service development. In the supply chain, aging service Integrator and aging service supplier create a principal-agent relationship, which usually leads to moral hazard problem. This paper studies the problem of controlling Aging Service Supplier to Moral Hazard in Multiphase Game. This paper presents the evolution rule of the Aging Service Supplier's reputation by analysis, therefore, the reputation's implicit effect on restraining the Aging Service Supplier's moral hazard is revealed. A strong reputation mechanism is proposed indeed. And analyze the critical condition when the mechanism can control the risk of moral hazard. Finally, the conclusion has carried on the numerical analysis.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhiyong Zhang AU - Haiping Wu AU - Yongqiang Shi PY - 2017/02 DA - 2017/02 TI - Reputation Mechanism in Multiphase Game to Control the Moral Hazard of Aging Service Supplier BT - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2016) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90 ID - Zhang2017/02 ER -