M&A, Institutional Investor and Executive Compensation
Qiwen Hu, Yongsheng Ge
Available Online July 2018.
- 10.2991/msam-18.2018.72How to use a DOI?
- M&A; executive compensation; institutional investor
The article try to explore the impact of M&A on executive compensation and further study the influence of institutional investors on the relationships between M&A and executive compensation. The study finds that the change in executive compensation has a significant positive correlation with M&A behavior, which reflects the fact that executives may tend to have self-interest in the event while the involvement of institutional investors will alleviate this problem. This study provides empirical evidence for institutional investor activism theory and the direction for corporate governance in M&A.
- © 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Qiwen Hu AU - Yongsheng Ge PY - 2018/07 DA - 2018/07 TI - M&A, Institutional Investor and Executive Compensation BT - Proceedings of the 2018 3rd International Conference on Modelling, Simulation and Applied Mathematics (MSAM 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 343 EP - 346 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/msam-18.2018.72 DO - 10.2991/msam-18.2018.72 ID - Hu2018/07 ER -