Game Analysis of the Internal Control Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on Incomplete Information
- Xiu-Qing Zang, Ting-Ting Han, Juan Lv
- Corresponding Author
- Xiu-Qing Zang
Available Online June 2014.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1How to use a DOI?
- Internal control information, Listed companies, Certified public accountants, Regulators; Game analysis.
- The laws and regulations issued by our government, to a certain extent, ensure the authenticity and completeness of the internal control information of listed companies. And promote the listed companies developing and implementing a sound and effective internal control system, thus avoiding the occurrence of fraud. From the angle of game, the disclosure of internal control information is a process of game between stakeholders. In this context, we construct an incomplete information dynamic game model of listed companies, certified public accountants and regulators and solve it by backward induction method. Several suggestions are provided for regulating the internal control information disclosure of listed companies.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiu-Qing Zang AU - Ting-Ting Han AU - Juan Lv PY - 2014/06 DA - 2014/06 TI - Game Analysis of the Internal Control Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on Incomplete Information BT - 2014 International Conference on Management Science and Management Innovation (MSMI 2014) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1 ID - Zang2014/06 ER -