Manager's Rent and Corporate Investment

DOI

10.2991/seiem-17.2018.117How to use a DOI?

Keywords

shareholder groups, inefficient investment, regulation, manager's rent

Abstract

This paper wants to figure out how will the pandering between the manager and shareholder groups affect corporate investment and how will regulations work on it. Using the pork model, By using a model of porkwe can find that the pleasing behavior of the manager will surely lead to overinvestment and regulations that solve this problemwhich were settled to fix this would lead to another type of inefficiency.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Junhe Zhang
PY  - 2017/12
DA  - 2017/12
TI  - Manager's Rent and Corporate Investment
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 469
EP  - 472
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/seiem-17.2018.117
DO  - 10.2991/seiem-17.2018.117
ID  - Zhang2017/12
ER  -